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Treatment for end-stage renal (kidney) disease
(ESRD) is the only government-funded health care
in the United States that has no financial need- or
age-based criteria; inclusion in the program
(Medicare) is solely based on diagnosis. If a person
has ESRD, treatment is covered by Medicare. No
other criteria must be met, but the best treatment
option, a transplant, is not available for most
patients. Compared with dialysis, a kidney trans-
plant significantly prolongs life and improves
quality of life, but kidneys are scarce in large part
because federal law prohibits the buying and sell-
ing of organs. The average waiting time for a kid-
ney transplant in the United States approaches 5
years; in some parts of the country, it is closer to 10
years. A significant number of transplant candi-
dates die while waiting for an altruistic donation
that never comes. Allowing the sale of kidneys
from living donors would greatly increase the sup-
ply of kidneys and thereby save lives and minimize
the number of patients suffering on dialysis.
The National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 was
passed to, among other things, prohibit the sale of
organs in the face of apprehension that the growing
commercialization of medicine would result in
human beings being treated as commodities rather
than individuals. Whether such concerns were well
founded or not, the act was clearly overbroad in its
prohibition of the sale of organs. It’s time to loosen
those restrictions in order to save lives. The best way
to increase the supply of kidneys without drastical-
ly changing the existing allocation system is to
legalize a regulated system of compensation for liv-
ing kidney donors. Such a system could be estab-
lished using the infrastructure already in place for
evaluating deceased donors and allocating their
organs. The only change required to ease and prob-
ably even solve the organ shortage is some form of
payment for donors.
The potential practical and theoretical con-
cerns with compensated donation can be over-
come, and alternative proposals will not do
enough to solve the shortage. Upon careful analy-
sis, it is clear that the benefits of a regulated system
of compensated donation (chiefly, increasing the
number of donated kidneys) outweigh any risks.
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Introduction:
The Kidney Shortage
(Realities and Possible
Solutions)
Patients with end-stage renal (kidney) dis-
ease (ESRD) have three options: no treat-
ment (in which case they will die), dialysis, or
a kidney transplant. Dialysis and a transplant
are not mutually exclusive. A patient may be
on dialysis before receiving a transplant, and,
if the transplant fails, may begin dialysis
again. However, a successful transplant (as
compared with dialysis) significantly pro-
longs life and improves quality of life.1 As a
consequence, as transplant technology
evolves, more patients with ESRD are opting
for transplants.
Survival after a transplant is better for
patients who undergo a transplant before a
prolonged interval of dialysis. In fact, a trans-
plant done before dialysis even starts (called a
“preemptive transplant”) has better results
than a transplant done after dialysis starts.2
For each additional year that a patient is on
dialysis before a transplant, the posttrans-
plant results are significantly poorer. Thus, a
preemptive, or at least a fairly early trans-
plant, provides significant advantages.
Because of the advantages (longer sur-
vival, better quality of life) of a preemptive
transplant over dialysis and of an early trans-
plant over a late transplant, most programs
now encourage the use of living kidney
donors. As long as donors are available, living
donation allows transplants to take place
sooner and is clearly associated with better
recipient survival rates than deceased donor
transplants. Transplant candidates without a
potential living donor must go on the wait-
ing list for a deceased donor kidney.
Each region of the United States has a list
of transplant candidates. When a deceased
donor kidney becomes available, it is allocat-
ed according to a predefined algorithm
designed to balance the principles of utility
(that is, to maximize results) and equity (that
is, to be as fair as possible to all the transplant
candidates on the list). 
As transplantation becomes an ever better
option than staying on dialysis, the demand
for transplants has increased, as has the
number of patients each year going on the
waiting list for a deceased donor transplant.
At the same time, the supply of donated kid-
neys has not kept up, and in fact, has barely
increased. As a consequence of this increased
demand in the face of a static supply, the
waiting list and the resultant waiting time for
a kidney transplant are getting longer. As
recently as 25 years ago, the average wait for a
deceased donor kidney in the United States
was about 1 year; currently, the average wait
is approaching 5 years (and, in many parts of
the country, is approaching 10 years).
This significant increase in waiting time
for a deceased donor has already had dire
consequences for transplant candidates. As
described above, the quality of life for kidney
transplant recipients is significantly better
than the quality of life on dialysis; thus,
increased waiting time on dialysis results in
more years with impaired quality of life. In
addition, more people on the waiting list are
dying: in 2001, in the United States, over 6
percent of waiting candidates died;3 by 2005,
this figure had increased to over 8 percent.4
Thus, with an average wait of more than 5
years, over 40 percent of listed candidates
may die before ever undergoing a transplant.
And as the waiting time approaches 10 years,
the majority of patients will die without an
opportunity for a transplant. Remember,
these patients were acceptable candidates
when listed, but as time passes, the chance
that a transplant will be successful decreases.
A review of University of Minnesota data
showed that the average (plus or minus stan-
dard error) age of patients who died while
waiting for a kidney was 53 (plus or minus
11) years. Seventy percent of those patients
were waiting for a first transplant and 70 per-
cent had a panel-reactive antibody (PRA)
level of less than 10 percent (that is, they
would be easy to match with a donor if there
were a sufficient supply).5
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Some opponents of compensation for
organs have argued that many of the waiting list
deaths have occurred in patients who were
“inactivated” on the list because they were too
sick for a transplant, that is, they argue that such
patients are not realistic transplant candidates
and that worrying about these deaths is not an
adequate justification for concern about a
shortage of organs. These arguments miss the
point. Each candidate who dies while waiting
for an organ was an acceptable candidate when
first listed; all were inactivated when their health
deteriorated on dialysis but stayed on the list in
the hope that they could recover enough to once
again be viable transplant candidates. 
In addition to candidates on “temporary
inactivation” there are others who deteriorate
and are permanently removed from the list
without being transplanted. These previous-
ly acceptable and now “removed from the
list” candidates do not show up in the “death
on the waiting list” statistics. A logical exten-
sion of the specious argument that many
deaths occur in inactivated patients is that we
could eliminate all deaths on the waiting list
by taking each patient off the waiting list just
before they die.
Because the number of waiting transplant
candidates is growing steadily, and because the
number of deceased donors has barely
increased (in North America) in the last decade,
the waiting list and waiting time are projected
to continue to increase.6 So it is inevitable that
in the future even more transplant candidates
will suffer and die while waiting for an organ
that never becomes available.
Band-Aid Solutions
The obvious solution to this dilemma is to
increase the number of donated kidneys. In
recent years, the number of living donor kidney
transplants has increased, particularly the
number of living unrelated donor transplants.
Yet that increase has not matched the marked-
ly increased demand. And, in spite of decades
of effort, donation of deceased donor kidneys
has only moderately increased.
Recently, a national effort to increase dona-
tion of deceased donor organs called the
Breakthrough Collaborative has had some
impact; however, the number of donated kid-
neys continues to fall far short of the need.
Moreover, it has recently been estimated that,
in the United States, even if all potential
deceased kidney donors became actual donors,
there would still be a shortage.7 The United
Network for Organ Sharing—the nonprofit
organization established by the U.S. Congress
in 1984 to administer the nation’s organ pro-
curement and transplantation network
(OPTN)—has proposed new goals for deceased
donor organ recovery for 2013.8 According to
UNOS projections, even if numerous initia-
tives such as the Breakthrough Collaborative
and acceptance of deceased donation after car-
diac death are totally successful, the profound
organ shortage and the prolonged waiting
times for a kidney will continue. Furthermore,
the need for organs (as defined by the number
of patients on the waiting list) probably
markedly underestimates the actual demand
(as defined by the number of patients who
would benefit from a kidney transplant). There
are tens of thousands of patients with ESRD
who are not listed for a transplant who need-
lessly suffer on dialysis without adding their
names to the organ waiting list because the
chances of receiving an organ are so low.9
Several novel attempts are now being made
to increase the number of available living
donor kidneys. Studies are finding ways to
allow donations from people who don’t share
the recipient’s blood type.10 More and more
institutions are allowing paired exchanges, a
system in which a recipient who has a willing
donor who is not a match exchanges that
donor with a recipient in a similar situation so
that each ends up with a donor who is a
match.11 And, some transplant programs are
experimenting with allowing nondirected
donations, in other words, allowing donations
from altruistic donors willing to donate to any-
one on the waiting list.12 However, these
approaches will only provide a relatively small
number of new donors. In combination, they
will not solve the shortage.
An alternative solution would be to limit
transplant candidates’ access to the waiting
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list. In fact, some researchers have argued that
the organ shortage is an artificial situation cre-
ated by those who have a vested interest in pro-
moting transplants.13 But, in reality, patients
with ESRD when given a choice between dialy-
sis and a transplant generally opt for a trans-
plant, since a successful transplant significant-
ly prolongs survival and improves quality of
life. Still, the transplant community could
develop stricter acceptance criteria in order to
limit access to the waiting list—thus decreasing
the average waiting time and improving out-
comes for those candidates fortunate enough
to be listed and then undergo a transplant. The
most likely criterion would be to limit access
based on a patient’s potential for long-term
success after a transplant. In fact, such a criteri-
on is the basis of a proposal to change the allo-
cation of available deceased donor kidneys to a
system based on maximizing life-years of sur-
vival.14 This criterion would minimize access
for older candidates and for candidates with
significant nonkidney-related disease (for
example, heart disease) by not allowing them
access to standard-criteria kidneys (that is,
ideal kidneys) and drive them to accept the less
good “expanded-criteria donor kidneys” (that
is, kidneys from less than ideal donors). Such
recipients do not survive as long as younger
recipients or those who have no additional dis-
ease. But the logical extension of this argument
would be to limit access to diabetics, to women,
to children, and to blacks (who have worse
long-term results than nondiabetics, men,
adults, and whites).
A Realistic Solution
The most practical solution to the organ
shortage would be a system of compensation
for living kidney donors that requires minimal
change in the existing system.15 The procedur-
al framework would be virtually identical to
the system currently used to evaluate altruistic
living donor organs, but the allocation system
used would be the one currently used for altru-
istic deceased donor organs. The deceased
donor model for allocation is appropriate
because there currently is no official allocation
system in place for living organ donations. At
this point almost all living donor organ dona-
tions are directed donations to family or
friends. Thus, by combining current existing
models for living and deceased organ procure-
ment and allocation, a system can be developed
that provides the following: a predefined algo-
rithm, such as the one used by UNOS, to
assure that everyone on the waiting list has the
same opportunity to undergo a transplant, full
evaluation of potential donors, informed con-
sent, careful oversight, long-term follow-up,
and treatment of donors with dignity, includ-
ing offering them recognition for providing a
lifesaving gift. The added element proposed
here is a fixed payment to donors by the gov-
ernment or a government-approved agency
(hereafter I will use the term compensated
donation). Existing prohibitions on private
sales would remain in place.
Compensation for donors could take
many forms. Options include a fixed pay-
ment, long-term health insurance, college
tuition, tax deductions, or some combina-
tion of these alternatives or other equally
valuable forms of compensation.16 Such a
system would likely not be feasible in all
countries, but would work only in countries
such at the United States or geographic areas
such as Europe where long-term donor
health care and long-term follow-up care can
be guaranteed. 
Furthermore, donors could not come
from other countries in order to be compen-
sated donors unless there is a way to ensure
long-term health care and long-term follow-
up when they return to their own countries.
Each component of the proposed system of
compensation for living kidney donors is critical
to the overall package. First, an algorithm for allo-
cation would be developed so that all recipients
on the list have the same opportunity for a trans-
plant. This algorithm could be identical to the
current (UNOS-derived) algorithm for allocating
deceased donor kidneys. The current UNOS
algorithm was designed to balance the principles
of utility and equity. Under the current system,
some deceased donor kidneys are, after removal,
shipped from one region or part of the country to
another. For obvious reasons, we might not want
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to do that with living donor kidneys. Importantly,
with our current screening criteria, success rates
would be equivalent for all living donor trans-
plants except perfectly matched siblings. That is,
differences in donor characteristics, such as age,
would not significantly affect results. (With
deceased donation, older donor kidneys are asso-
ciated with inferior long-term results, but this is
not so with living donation because, unlike with
deceased donation, there is ample time to effec-
tively screen potential living donors.)
Second, the compensated donor evalua-
tion, at a minimum, must be as complete as the
current conventional living donor evaluation.
We may want to include additional testing,
such as viral testing done twice (at six-month
intervals), or psychosocial testing to study the
motivation and the stability of potential com-
pensated donors.
Third, informed consent is critical. Each
step of the evaluation, allocation, follow-up,
and compensation must be transparent. Early
in the process, the risks of the evaluation and
surgery would have to be clearly explained. A
“cooling-off period” should be required, allow-
ing the donor time to evaluate whether the
benefits warrant the risks. (Mandatory viral
testing at six-month intervals would provide
adequate time for this cooling-off period.)
Fourth, careful oversight of the process
would assure the safety and health of both
donors and recipients. Today in the United
States, UNOS and the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services provide oversight of deceased
donor kidney use and allocation, including
studies of short-term and long-term results for
recipients. In the compensatory system present-
ed here we would continue the same type of
oversight but also include studies of donor out-
comes. It will be important to determine if there
are any differences in short-term or long-term
results for conventional versus compensated
donors. Numerous studies of conventional
donors suggest no increased risk as compared
with the age-matched nondonor population,
and kidney failure in donors occurs at the same
rate as would be expected in the age-matched
general population.17 In fact, studies from
Sweden suggest that donors live longer than the
general population.18 Although this benefit may
be due to selection bias, these studies at least
show that donors’ lives are not shorter. 
Fifth, it will be our responsibility to create
a “culture of dignity” for compensated dona-
tion. Our conventional living donors are
heroes—even though we realize their motiva-
tions are complex. Likewise, compensated
donors should be treated as heroes.
And finally, there would be a regulated sys-
tem of compensation. Compensation to all
donors would be similar, but perhaps not iden-
tical. A menu of options would provide each
donor with something that has personal value.
For example, health insurance may be of value
to those who do not have work-related health
insurance but not to others. A tax break may be
of value to some, direct compensation to oth-
ers. Under the system advocated here, no other
commercialization would be allowed. All legal
allocation of organs and payment for organs
would take place through the government or a
government-determined contractor. Currently
existing prohibitions on private brokers and
contact between the donor and recipient
would remain in place.
None of the initiatives to increase living or
deceased donation mentioned here are mutual-
ly exclusive. It would be reasonable to move for-
ward with compensation for donation while
simultaneously pursuing initiatives to study
cross-blood-type matches, to allow paired dona-
tions, and to increase deceased donation.
Consequences
Allowing Realistic Incentives for Organs
Would Save Lives
Compensated donation would increase the
number of kidneys available for transplants,
thereby shortening waiting time, improving
patient survival rates, and minimizing suffer-
ing on dialysis.
Unfortunately, until there is a clinical trial
of a system of compensated donation, we will
not know whether its potential can be ful-
filled. Given the absence of this knowledge,
where is the burden of proof? Many of those
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who argue against such a system point to the
lack of evidence that a system that allows
financial incentives will work and, therefore,
say that such a system should not be tried.
But the opposite is true.19 Because patients
are dying while waiting for a kidney, we should
lift the ban on compensated donation, unless
opponents can provide any reasonable argu-
ments justifying its continuation.20 After all,
currently everyone but the donor already bene-
fits financially from a transplant (physicians,
coordinators, hospitals, recipients). Moreover,
ample legal precedent already exists for com-
pensated donation of body parts (such as sperm
or eggs) and for payments to surrogate mothers. 
A prima facie case for compensated kidney
donation can be made on the basis of two
claims: the “good donor claim” and the “sale-
of-tissue claim.”21 The good donor claim
stems from the fact that it is already legal for a
living person to donate a kidney, as it should
be. If donating a kidney is legal, and if the only
difference between donating a kidney and sell-
ing one is the motive of monetary self-interest,
and if the motive of monetary self-interest
does not on its own warrant legal prohibition,
then it follows that compensated kidney
donation should be allowed. The sale-of-tissue
claim stems from the fact that it is legal (and
rightfully so) for living persons to sell parts of
their bodies (blood, sperm, eggs). Thus, it is
clear that monetary self-interest does not on
its own warrant legal prohibition. If we oppose
compensated kidney donation (as opposed to
the sale of sperm or eggs) because nephrecto-
my is more dangerous, then we should also
oppose uncompensated kidney donation; if
we oppose compensated kidney donation
because people should not sell body parts,
then we should also oppose the compensated
donation of sperm or eggs.22
Another argument in favor of compensat-
ed donation relates to autonomy. The ban on
compensated donation is paternalistic and
ignores the need to respect individual auton-
omy. In general, with “few constraints, people
make personal decisions on what they wish
to buy and sell based on their own values,”
and should be allowed to do so.23
Finally, we cannot ignore the fact that
although most countries have laws against the
sale of organs, a growing black market for com-
pensated donation already exists—a market in
which donors are often poorly evaluated and
cared for and most of the payment goes to a
broker.24 Many ESRD patients, desperate for a
transplant, travel to take advantage of such
opportunities. Development of a regulated sys-
tem will help limit this phenomenon of “trans-
plant tourism.” Eliminating the legislative ban
on compensated donation and establishing a
regulated system may also eliminate or mini-
mize the ongoing growth of black market
organ dealing. Thus, those people who sell a
kidney will be better compensated and better
cared for.25 As conceded by the International
Congress on Ethics in Organ Transplantation
in December 2002:
The well established position of transplan-
tation societies against commerce in
organs has not been effective in stopping
the rapid growth of such transplants
around the world. Individual countries will
need to study alternative, locally relevant
models, considered ethical in their soci-
eties, which would increase the number of
transplants, protect and respect the donor,
and reduce the likelihood of rampant,
unregulated commerce.26
Allowing Compensation for Kidneys
Could Save Taxpayers Money
It is important to recognize that, because
dialysis is so much more expensive than a trans-
plant, compensation for donors could be cost-
effective.27 Dr. M. Schnitzler and I have estimat-
ed that each living unrelated donor kidney
transplant saves Medicare about $95,000. It is
difficult to quantify the value transplant recipi-
ents place on their improved quality of life, but
the actual dollar savings to the federal govern-
ment because transplant recipients, unlike
most dialysis patients, lead normal productive
lives can be estimated.28 Once recovered from
surgery, transplant recipients can resume nor-
mal work schedules and care for themselves
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and their households as they did before they
were diagnosed with kidney disease. They no
longer, or never, need to spend 9 to 15 hours a
week hooked up to a dialysis machine, and they
won’t be debilitated by fatigue, bloating, and
thirst as dialysis patients often are. We estimate
that these quality-of-life differences would save
the federal government an additional $75,000
in lost income taxes and nonmedical services
commonly needed by dialysis patients. In light
of a total federal savings of around $270,000
(including putting a value on improved quality-
of-life), it would be cost-neutral, on top of sav-
ing taxpayers money, for the government to
spend as much as $95,000 per transplant to pay
for infrastructure and donor compensation.29
Recently, the Congressional Budget Office
evaluated the financial implications of paired
donation (defined above). With a paired donor
transplant, two individuals who would other-
wise have remained on long-term dialysis
undergo transplants. When “scoring” this pro-
posal, the CBO recognized the long-term
financial savings associated with transplants
(as compared with dialysis); they credited
paired donation with long-term savings for
both recipients, sparing the Medicare program
from spending thousands of dollars for
numerous years of dialysis. Similar savings
could come from compensated donation.30
The Current System for Distributing
Organs Can Easily be Adapted to Handle
Compensated Living Organ Donation 
In the United States, each transplant cen-
ter currently has clinical transplant coordina-
tors and a protocol for evaluating living
donors. In addition, each center belongs to an
organ procurement organization (OPO),
whose coordinators are responsible for recov-
ering and allocating deceased donor organs.
UNOS, which oversees the overall allocation
of deceased donor organs, and each OPO
have an algorithm for deceased donor organ
allocation. Similar mechanisms exist in other
countries. A system of donor compensation
could use existing facilities and existing
administrative structures. In fact, a precedent
has already been set: in some regions of the
United States, OPO coordinators are respon-
sible for evaluating and allocating living
donor organs from altruistic donors who are
not specifically donating to a relative or
friend.31 Such donations are commonly
referred to as “nondirected organ donations.”
National criteria could be established
regarding what tests and results should be
required in compensated donor evaluations.
Evaluations could be coordinated by the OPO
and then reviewed at the OPO by a panel con-
sisting of a transplant surgeon, transplant
physician, social worker, OPO coordinator,
and donor advocate.32 If the donor is accept-
ed, then a regional crossmatched list would be
generated and the kidney would be offered to
the highest-ranked candidate on the waiting
list in accordance with UNOS criteria. If the
center or the potential recipient accepts the
offer, the detailed evaluation would be sent to
the center (which, again, would have the
opportunity to accept or reject the offer). If
the center or potential recipient rejects the
offer, the next candidate on the list would be
offered the kidney. All bills generated by the
donor evaluation, donor surgery, and donor
follow-up would be sent to the OPO.
Administration, including payment to the
donor and long-term follow-up, would be
done at the OPO level. When a transplant was
finally scheduled and done, the center would
be charged an acquisition fee by the OPO,
which would be compensated by the govern-
ment (Medicare) or the recipient’s insurance
(if the transplant were done before ESRD).
Having the evaluation, allocation, and follow-
up coordinated by the OPO would allow
national reporting and oversight.
From a practical perspective, setting up a
national computer database of donor evalua-
tions would be useful. Thus, a donor rejected
in one OPO would not go to another OPO
and again incur the costs of evaluation. Such
a registry could also be used for long-term
follow-up of accepted donors.
The Realities of Who Donates
There is no doubt that creating additional
incentives for living organ donation will
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increase the availability of organs for trans-
plantation, but estimating how much such
incentives are likely to increase the pool of
available donors requires an understanding
of why people donate.
It is naive to believe in a clear dichotomy
between prospective donors, that is, between
those purely motivated by altruism and those
purely motivated by incentives. Instead, a
continuum between these extremes is more
probable. Transplant teams recognize that
current conventional donors (family mem-
bers and friends) often donate for multiple
reasons. For example, whereas altruism cer-
tainly plays a role, there is often a component
of family pressure or of secondary gain. 
As the recent Institute of Medicine report
states:
Confusion has marred much of the dis-
cussion [of organ donation] . . . perhaps
because of an assumption that a dona-
tion or a gift system . . . is necessarily
grounded in altruism. However, the
ordinary experience of gift-giving
among families or friends should be suf-
ficient to dispel that notion—the
motives of gift givers are often quite
complex and may reflect a combination
of generosity, perceived obligation, and a
desire to be regarded with favor.33
At the same time, many potential conven-
tional donors whose major motivation is altru-
ism cannot afford to take off time for the
surgery (because of their lack of disability insur-
ance or of compensated vacation from work);
others are concerned about long-term health
care (because they do not have health insur-
ance).34 Thirty-nine percent of surveyed trans-
plant programs in the United States reported
potential living donors declining donation
because of future insurance fears.35 Such indi-
viduals might be willing to proceed with dona-
tion if a package of incentives (including long-
term health insurance) were available.
A review of 35 studies from 12 countries
on direct and indirect costs incurred by living
donors showed that altruistic donation is not
cheap.36 Travel or accommodation costs were
incurred by 9 to 99 percent of donors and
were higher in countries with larger land
mass; 14 to 30 percent incurred costs for lost
income; 9 to 44 percent incurred costs for
dependent care; 8 percent incurred costs for
domestic help.37 There are also some con-
cerns regarding costs for analgesics after the
surgery. A review of studies done internation-
ally from 1972 through 2006 on donors’
insurability found 2 to 14 percent of donors
were concerned about insurability and 3 to
11 percent actually encountered difficulties
with their insurance.38
Some Practical Considerations
Many practical considerations are involved
in establishing a system of compensation for
organ donation. Each of the following ques-
tions will require considerable discussion.
1. Should there be a minimum age restric-
tion? In North America, 18-year-olds can join
the military, vote, and be conventional kidney
donors. However, in most states, young adults
cannot legally drink until age 21. Car rental
companies, recognizing the typical poor driving
record of so many young drivers, have different
restrictions and rates for those under age 25.
Given such concerns regarding the judgment of
young adults, it might be reasonable to set a
higher minimum age for compensated donors
than the current minimum of 18 used for con-
ventional donors.
2. Should all living donors be compensat-
ed? That is, should conventional donors to
family members or friends also be compensat-
ed? As discussed above, many conventional
donors have concerns about long-term health
care. A system could be established where all
living donors receive equal compensation.
Alternatively, there could be a two-tiered sys-
tem of incentives, as mentioned above, one for
conventional donors who give a kidney to a
specific family member or friend (incentives
could include health and life insurance as well
as reimbursement for expenses and lost wages)
and one for compensated donors who give a
kidney for allocation to a waiting list (incen-
tives could similarly include health and life
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insurance as well as reimbursement for expens-
es and lost wages, along with other options
such as a tax break or direct payment).
3. How would payment be distributed? A
study conducted at the University of Minne-
sota suggests that, in the United States, a living
donor transplant saves taxpayers more than
$95,000, compared with maintaining a patient
on long-term dialysis.39 Some of the available
savings could be used to support the donation
infrastructure, to fund long-term follow-up
studies, and to pay for donor incentives such as
life, health, or long-term care insurance. If
direct payment to donors is an option, it would
have to be decided if such payments would be
in a lump sum or parceled out in installments
at follow-up visits. In addition, policies would
have to be developed regarding whether or not
payment would affect welfare benefits or taxes
or would be subject to attachment by other
concerned parties (such as creditors or ex-
spouses).
4. How would the health status of poten-
tial compensated donors be verified?
Verification is both a practical and an ethical
issue. From a practical perspective, potential
compensated donors could be evaluated
twice (as with viral studies), at six-month
intervals. Doing so would not guarantee safe-
ty, but it would minimize the risk. Potential
recipients could be informed about the limi-
tations of the evaluation process (similarly,
some limitations apply to the current con-
ventional donor pool) and sign an appropri-
ately developed “informed consent” form.
5. How would logistics be handled? Some
logistical issues would have to be resolved before
a system of compensated donation could be
implemented. For example, would only local
recipients be considered or could organs go to a
national list? Would compensated donors have
to travel to a recipient’s center?
6. Would the line be drawn at kidneys? If we
establish a system for compensated kidney
donation, should we also have a system for
compensated donation of a liver lobe, a lung
lobe, or a partial pancreas? Could a compen-
sated donor return repeatedly for sale of more
body parts? Living donor liver, lung, and pan-
creas transplants have all been done success-
fully. But for each, the donor morbidity rate is
higher than after kidney donation. In addi-
tion, considerably more information is avail-
able on long-term follow-up after kidney
donation than after living liver, lung, or pan-
creas donation. For these reasons, perhaps a
compensated donor system should at first be
limited to kidneys, but once such a system is
established and running well, other organ
donors could also be considered.
So Why Doesn’t the
United States Already
Allow the Sale of Kidneys?
There is little doubt that a regulated sys-
tem of incentives for live organ donation is
feasible and would increase the supply of
much needed organs, yet the United States
does not have such a system. Why not?
First, policymakers confuse a system like
the one being advocated here with what hap-
pens when there is a black market in organs,
as exists in some countries.40
Second, it is important to note there are
historical reasons for not having a system of
compensated organ donation in the United
States. As the recent Institute of Medicine
report clarified,   “According to the chair of
the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act draft com-
mittee, the drafters did not intend to encour-
age or discourage payment for organs; ‘it is
possible,’ he states, ‘that abuses may occur if
payment could customarily be demanded,
but every payment is not necessarily unethi-
cal.’”41 The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act,
passed in 1968, and recently revised in 2006,
provides a uniform legal framework for
organ donation and gives adults the right to
donate their bodies or organs upon their
death without subsequent “veto by others.”42
Twenty-five years ago, a kidney transplant
was seen as a quality-of-life operation rather
than an operation that prolonged survival. In
addition, the average waiting time for a deceased
donor kidney was about 1 year. Living unrelated
donor transplants were rare because at that time
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medical professionals believed that the results
would be similar to deceased donor transplants,
and, therefore, the risk to the donor was not jus-
tified. It was in this context that compensated
donation was first proposed and rejected. In
1987 the World Medical Association declared,
“The purchase and sale of human organs for
transplantation is condemned.”43 The Inter-
national Transplantation Society stated in 1986,
“No transplant surgeon/team shall be involved
directly or indirectly in the buying or selling of
organs/tissues or in any transplant activity
aimed at commercial gain.”44 And, in 1991 the
World Health Organization recommended that
physicians not transplant organs “if they have
reason to believe that the organs concerned have
been the subject of commercial transactions.”45
In the United States, the ban on sales was
established with passage of the National
Organ Transplant Act in 1984. This act made
it a federal crime to “knowingly acquire,
receive, or otherwise transfer any human
organ for valuable consideration for use in
human transplantation if the transfer affects
interstate commerce.”46 This ban was, in part,
in direct response to one individual’s attempt
to establish a brokerage service in which he
would purchase organs, particularly in devel-
oping countries, for transplants in the
United States.47
However, dramatic changes in the last 20
years have led to a reexamination of many of
the policies established two or more decades
ago. For example, it is now widely accepted that
an unrelated living donor transplant (which a
compensated donor transplant would likely
be) has results equivalent to those of a related
living donor transplant.48 Also, as discussed
above, because of the improvement in trans-
plant outcomes, more patients with ESRD are
opting for a transplant, and waiting lists and
resultant waiting times are getting markedly
longer. It is in this context that compensated
donation must be reconsidered.
In the mid-1990s, when the shortage of
organs was not as severe as it is today, two sepa-
rate groups discussed the possibility of financial
incentives for donation. The Bellagio Task Force
Report on Transplantation, Body Integrity, and
the International Traffic in Organs (convened
under the auspices of the Center for the Study of
Society and Medicine of the College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia
University) found no ethical principle that
would justify a ban on compensated donation
under all circumstances.49 The International
Forum for Transplant Ethics concluded that the
discussion of compensated organ donation
needs to be reopened.50
In addition, the general public favors finan-
cial incentives. In fact, two national surveys
(done when the waiting list was less of a prob-
lem) reported that the general public is much
more willing than the medical community to
accept the idea of compensation for organ dona-
tion.51 In 1991, a study found that 52 percent of
the general public favored compensation.52 A
subsequent study found that 70 percent of the
general public and 51 percent of medical stu-
dents, but only 25 percent of surveyed physi-
cians and nurses, favored compensation.53
Medical attitudes may be changing in response
to the long waiting lists: at a recent meeting of
the American Society of Transplant Surgeons
(January 2007), the majority of attendees voiced
approval of a trial of compensation for dona-
tion. Similarly, the vast majority of attendees at
an international meeting on living donation
(held in Essen, Germany, in June 2007) favored a
trial of compensated donation. 
Arguments against
Compensated Donation
Numerous arguments have been made
against compensated donation. Yet, it is
noteworthy that the discussion of compen-
sated donation is occurring in an environ-
ment in which we accept “altruistic” living
donation. Any effective argument against
compensated donation must justify the ban
on compensation while simultaneously per-
mitting altruistic donation.54
As discussed above, the ban on compensa-
tion for organ donation has significant detri-
mental consequences for patients with ESRD.
In reviewing the individual arguments against
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compensated donation (or a combination of
them), one must ask this overriding question: Is
this argument (or, are these arguments) suffi-
cient to allow patients to continue to suffer and
die on dialysis when something can be done to
increase their quality of life and chances of sur-
vival? Tom Beauchamp and James Childress,
the authors of the definitive textbook on
bioethics, defined four principles to apply in
bioethics discussions: a) respect for autonomy;
b) beneficence, including both the obligation to
benefit others (positive beneficence) and to
maximize good (utility); c) justice (fair and equi-
table distribution of benefits and burdens); and
d) nonmaleficence, the obligation not to inflict
harm.55 They argue that when these principles
conflict (as with kidney donation), they must
be balanced. Our society accepts that the advan-
tages of conventional living donation (which
respects donors’ autonomy and maximizes out-
come for patients with ESRD) outweigh poten-
tial harms (risks to donors). The question still
undecided in the political realm, although not
in the eyes of the public at large, is whether the
advantages of compensated donation would
also outweigh potential harms.
The arguments that have been made against
compensated donation (and some counterargu-
ments) are briefly outlined below.56
Arguments that Do Not Distinguish
between Conventional Donation and
Compensation
The compensated donor would be harmed.
Some researchers argue that the surgery for
compensated donors could be associated with
death and complications. Currently, the mortal-
ity rate associated with altruistic living kidney
donation is 0.03 percent.57 If compensated
donors are screened as thoroughly as today’s
altruistic living donors, the mortality rate would
likely remain about 0.03 percent; the surgical
and long-term risks for compensated donors
would be identical to the risks for altruistic liv-
ing donors.58 As discussed above, if these risks
alone are sufficient to justify the ban on com-
pensated donation, they should also justify a
ban on altruistic donation. One novel form of
the argument about potential donor harm is
that compensated donors may be less healthy
(because of, say, poorer nutrition) than altruistic
donors and that their surgical and long-term
risks may therefore be higher. But no evidence
supports this contention. Assuming we develop
and maintain adequate screening standards,
complications after compensated donation
should be no different from complications after
altruistic donation.
Genuine consent would be impossible. Some
bioethicists argue that, because incentives are
involved, a potential compensated donor can-
not ever truly provide genuine consent. But, this
argument rests on a paternalistic attitude that
someone other than the individuals involved are
best able to weigh the risks and benefits and
ignores a fundamental tenet of current medical
practice and philosophy—autonomy. Others
argue that some potential compensated donors
may be unable to fully understand the risks; but
this objection also applies to altruistic living
donors, whom we feel capable of screening and
educating. The information on risks provided to
a compensated donor would be identical to that
provided to an altruistic donor. If a ban is justi-
fied on the grounds that some potential com-
pensated donors may not understand the risks,
then that should justify a ban on altruistic dona-
tions as well.
Not enough is known about long-term risk
to donors. Another argument in this category
is that not enough is known about long-term
risk to donors. Yet we know enough to state
that there is little increased long-term risk.59
Again, if our screening practices are similar
for altruistic and compensated donors, long-
term risks should be the same.
Arguments with No Supporting Data
Donation should be altruistic. Historically,
bioethicists, among others, have argued that
donation should be altruistic. But there is no
reason it must be this way. There are many
reasons beyond pure altruism why individu-
als donate.60 In addition, our current practice
of altruistic donation is not working. The
waiting list and resultant waiting time are
getting longer every year.
As discussed above, the recent Institute of
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Medicine report, in discussing altruism as the
sole motive for donation, states that “the
motives of gift givers are often quite complex
and may reflect a combination of generosity,
perceived obligation, and a desire to be regarded
with favor.”61 Studies have shown that a signifi-
cant percentage of current altruistic donors feel
pressure (external or internal) to donate.62
Altruistic donation would decrease. Some
detractors fear that if a system of compensated
donation were established, altruistic living
donation might decrease. But no evidence sup-
ports this concern. In fact, there are many rea-
sons to believe that altruistic donation would
continue at close to the same rate as takes place
today. First, some recipients would continue to
want to know their donor. As discussed below,
they may have concerns about the “quality” of
compensated donor kidneys. Families with
these concerns might opt for altruistic dona-
tion. Second, with the system of compensated
donation described here, waiting time is likely
to be reduced but not eliminated. Outcome for
kidney transplant recipients is better with a
preemptive transplant (discussed above), so
many recipients would still opt for preemptive
transplants from altruistic donors rather than
waiting until they are on dialysis.63 Third,
potential compensated donors may turn out
to be demographically different (for example,
older) from potential altruistic donors, provid-
ing another reason to possibly prefer an altru-
istic donor kidney, even though adequate
screening should eliminate any concerns typi-
cally associated with age.
In addition, if altruistic donation decreased
and the total number of available organs
increased, the end result would still be positive.
As noted above, living unrelated and living
related transplants have equivalent results.64 So
if a system of compensated donation increased
the total number of available kidneys, more
patients would be provided a successful trans-
plant. Nevertheless, in some situations, a family
might rather turn to a compensated donor
than to a family member or an altruistic friend.
If so, there could be some decrease in altruistic
donation (probably related to how long the
waiting list is, once a compensated donor sys-
tem is established). Some of that decrease may
be good. First, we do not know how much fam-
ily pressure is involved in related donation; pre-
sumably a compensated donor system could
reduce that sort of pressure. Second, currently
in the United States, the criteria for acceptance
of living donors are being expanded (for exam-
ple, donors with single-drug hypertension or
obese donors are now allowed in some centers).
An expanded-criteria donor is usually accepted
only if he or she is the sole available donor for
an individual recipient. The argument made is
that the risk to the recipient of having a long
wait on dialysis is greater then the risk to the
expanded-criteria donor. A large compensated
donor system might eliminate the need to use
expanded-criteria donors. Clearly, whether
compensated donation would result in a signif-
icant decrease in altruistic donation cannot be
known for sure without trying a compensated
donation system and studying its effects on
altruistic donation.
One practical question is whether it would
be better to provide incentives to all living
donors or only to some. Currently, about 49
million Americans do not have health insur-
ance. Concerns about short- or long-term
health issues prevent many potential donors
from donating.65 If incentives such as health
and life insurance are provided to all donors,
donation may increase. It would be wrong to
provide health coverage for compensated
donors but not for altruistic donors. As men-
tioned earlier, a two-tiered system of incentives
could be developed, one for altruistic donors
who give their kidney to a specific family mem-
ber or friend (incentives could include health
and life insurance as well as reimbursement for
expenses and lost wages) and one for compen-
sated donors who give their kidney to be allo-
cated to the waiting list (incentives could simi-
larly include health and life insurance as well as
reimbursement for expenses and lost wages,
along with other options such as a tax break or
direct payment).
Deceased donation would decrease. Another
question is whether allowing compensation for
living donors will cause a decrease in the sup-
ply of deceased organs. This is unlikely because
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only kidneys, and perhaps partial livers, lungs,
and pancreases are currently suitable for living
donation and there will continue to be a great
need for organs such as hearts, which could
never be supplied by living donors. But elimi-
nating the ban on payment to living donors
may result in the families of deceased donors
lobbying for payment as well. As discussed
above, the arguments for and against compen-
sation for living and deceased donors differ.
For example, living donors will experience pain
and will require time for recuperation; and
with compensated living donation, the com-
pensation would go directly to the donor.
Although the potential for providing compen-
sation for deceased organs is not precluded by
what is argued here, the arguments are differ-
ent and would need separate analysis from
what is provided here.
Trust in government and/or doctors would
erode. Some authors on this topic are con-
cerned that, if a government-sponsored system
of compensation is established, society’s trust
in the government or in doctors would erode.
If the government (or its appointed agency)
were the sole buyer of kidneys as suggested
here, there is concern that the government
would be seen as preying on the poor rather
than providing a safety net.66 Some authors
argue that the government would then have
less incentive to provide social benefits,
because the poor could go out and sell a kidney
(which would save Medicare money). But no
evidence supports this claim. The government
function of providing for the needy would not
be in direct conflict with its other function of
buying and providing kidneys for patients on
the organ waiting list. But, even if such con-
flicts existed, government agencies often have
competing priorities (for example, consumer
advocacy vs. environmental protection, devel-
oping the economy vs. raising the minimum
wage, minimizing dependence on foreign oil
vs. preserving the country’s wilderness). The
goal of purchasing kidneys would be to save
lives—certainly an acceptable goal for the gov-
ernment. A system that allows for compensated
donation, with appropriate screening, good
postoperative follow-up, and a substantial pay-
ment to the compensated donor, could be
managed with care and dignity so that respect
for neither the government nor the medical
profession would diminish. 
Another argument is that allowing com-
pensated organ donation would damage the
traditional doctor-patient relationship.67 But,
no evidence suggests that compensated dona-
tion would have any negative impact on either
patient care or compensated donors’ expecta-
tions of doctors. No evidence suggests that
medical care for surrogate mothers (analogous
to compensated donors) or egg donors (who
also undergo an operative procedure) has dif-
fered in any way from the current standard of
practice. Presumably, compensated donors
would be given the same care as altruistic living
donors (and much better care than compen-
sated donors currently receive in black mar-
kets). In addition, if long-term health care were
one of the benefits, many compensated donors
would likely have access to both more and bet-
ter health care than they did before donation.
A system of compensation would be abused.
There is no reason to assume that individuals
involved in compensated donation would have
any more or less reason to lie than those
involved in altruistic donation. In each situation
there may be much to gain or to lose. An altruis-
tic donor may lie about health status and risks
in order to help someone they very much want
to help or, on the other hand, someone being
pressured to donate who really doesn’t want to
do so may lie in order to be disqualified from
donation. The argument that physicians or
transplant personnel might relax acceptance cri-
teria is equally suspect; there is no reason for a
physician (who receives the same compensation
whether the donor is a compensated donor or
an altruistic donor) to be more prone to misrep-
resent acceptance criteria for compensated
donors. Abuse by potential donors could be
minimized by appropriate screening and over-
sight; for example, as mentioned earlier, poten-
tial compensated donors might be required to
undergo viral screening twice, at six-month
intervals. Furthermore, is the mere potential for
abuse a sufficient reason to allow waiting trans-
plant candidates to die? We don’t allow the pos-
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sibility of abuse to justify bans on numerous
other priorities. Even though some people
speed, we do not ban fast cars.
Illogical Arguments
Unregulated systems have failed elsewhere.
This is an argument against allowing the
black market to thrive as it does in some
countries, not against establishing a system
such as the one suggested here.
Congress and various professional societies
have already voted to prohibit compensation, so
that ends the discussion. Those votes occurred
in an era when the waiting time for a
deceased donor kidney was short, and the
likelihood of dying while waiting was low. As
discussed above, the situation for today’s
patients and donors is quite different. We
already accept that any number of previous
congressional or societal decisions (for exam-
ple, on slavery or on women’s rights) can be
changed as public standards evolve. Life
insurance is now common, yet at one time it
was maligned as improper commodification.
Placing a financial value on human life as
done by the life insurance industry was ini-
tially thought an affront to human dignity
and a form of “putting death on the market”
that devalued the sanctity of human life.68
The notion of compensation for organs is
closely analogous to how Americans previ-
ously felt about life insurance.
Some researchers argue that, because
compensated donation is currently a con-
tentious issue, politicians (always concerned
about reelection) would be reluctant to pro-
pose and fight for a change in the law.
Whether or not this is true, it is not an argu-
ment either for or against compensated
donation. Certainly, it was difficult to change
the law to allow emancipation of women and
blacks. Presumably, since there are surveys
(see earlier discussion) that show the public
generally supports a system of compensated
donation, politicians should be willing to
eliminate the ban, at least if what was found
in the surveys is confirmed through polling.
The sale of blood has failed. The failure
referred to in such arguments occurred before
effective testing was available for human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and hepatitis.
Our blood screening tests are now much bet-
ter, so today we are comfortable that we can
effectively screen the blood of potential
donors, both altruistic ones and those com-
pensated for their donations. 
Organized religions would object. Actually,
almost all organized religions currently sup-
port conventional organ donation. And all
Western religions give priority to saving a life.
In Judeo-Christian culture, saving lives takes
precedence over other religious laws and cus-
toms. Where individual religious authorities
fail to take a formal stand for or against com-
pensated donation,69 individual religious
donors can choose on their own whether to be
compensated or not. Furthermore, in a coun-
try that prides itself on maintaining the sepa-
ration of church and state, religious belief
should not determine law and public policy.70
Financial incentives would constitute coer-
cion. Some philosophers define the word “coer-
cion” as “persuasion [of an unwilling person]
to do something by using force or threats.”71
No potential compensated donor can be
coerced by the opportunity to be compensated
for donation. The term “coercion” is often mis-
used when authors invoke it to suggest that
payment might “manipulate the victim’s pref-
erences, even if it would be rational to accept”72
or that “the intent of the offer is to elicit behav-
ior that contradicts the individual’s normal
operative goals.”73 The fact of payment does
not indicate that the compensated donor’s
choice isn’t free and voluntary.74 As noted by
one theorist, “it is unclear why engaging in
market transactions with the poor constitutes
the use of coercive power, while doing so with
the middle class or the wealthy is an appropri-
ate expression of personal freedom.”75
Moreover, if this “financial pressure” is suffi-
cient to justify a ban on compensated dona-
tion, then psychological or emotional pressure
that may occur in related donation should jus-
tify a ban on altruistic donation. Furthermore,
a ban on compensated donation is clearly over-
broad because it also stops potential donors
who are not financially vulnerable.76
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“Coercion” is different from “peaceful per-
suasion.” Coercion violates the free choice of
persons, whereas peaceful persuasion “grounds
the very process of negotiation through which
individuals fashion consensual agreements.”77
As succinctly put in an article by Mark J.
Cherry: “To be coercive, rather than peaceably
manipulative, requires showing that making
such an offer places potential compensated
donors into unjustified, disadvantaged cir-
cumstances. Financial offers may be ‘seduc-
tive,’ but they are not subtle threats.”78
The coercive argument can be phrased dif-
ferently.79 Some observers who are concerned
about “coercion” do not see the poor as being
coerced by the offer itself. Instead, they
believe that “a market in human kidneys
would enable the poverty of destitute people
to coerce them into selling their kidneys and
would provide the necessary conditions for
the poor to suffer from impaired autonomy
in a way that they would not otherwise suf-
fer.”80 Therefore, the argument goes, pro-
hibiting compensation protects the poor
from a limitation of their autonomy. 
But poverty in and of itself cannot coerce.81
Coercion requires an “agent” trying to control
the potential seller. James S. Taylor, in his
book Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human
Body Parts Are a Moral Imperative, points out
that “a person’s economic situation is not an
intentional entity, and so it makes no sense to
claim that it intends to exercise control over
the persons who find themselves within it.
Impoverished people thus cannot give up any
degree of control over their actions to that
which is already allegedly coercing them, that
is, their economic situation.”82
We should do more preventive medicine. Of
course this is true, yet we still have a shortage
of organs. And given what we know of the
causes of ESRD, it is not preventable, as some
once thought it might be.83
Other current initiatives are working. As
discussed above, even if all new initiatives
succeed, there would still not be sufficient
kidneys to meet the need. More needs to be
done than simply encourage an increase in
altruistic donation.
Once we allow compensated donation, we
cannot return to altruistic donation. Some
opponents argue that a regulated system of
organ donation that allows compensation
would fail. They argue that, once we start a trial
of compensated donation, we could never
return to the conventional altruistic system.
But there is no reason why we could not have a
temporary clinical trial of compensated dona-
tion. For example, the ban could be lifted for
three years so that trials could be done; then
there could be a planned one-year moratorium
thereafter, in order to evaluate results and
reach conclusions. Such trials could also be
limited in their regional scope and not be done
in every part of the country. After evidence
from these trials is available, there could be
open discussion as to whether or not to per-
manently lift the ban.
The system proposed here is a blanket legal-
ization of black market practices. As discussed
above, for a system of compensated donation
to work, certain precautions must be taken: 
• Allocation of kidneys by a predefined
algorithm so that everyone on the list
has an opportunity to undergo a trans-
plant;
• Full evaluation of potential donors;
• Informed consent;
• Careful oversight;
• Long-term follow-up;
• Treatment of the donor with dignity,
including recognition for providing a
lifesaving gift; and
• A fixed payment to the donor by the
government or government-approved
agency and no one else.
Approval of such a system should in no way
be seen as giving license to currently existing
black markets. It is purely alarmist and illogical
to accuse those who advocate one thing of in
fact advocating something else. The United
States operates under a well-established rule of
law, and nothing in this proposal suggests
abandoning that system in favor of a free-for-
all where the government protects neither the
rights of recipients nor of donors.
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Arguments that Equate Compensation with
Wrongful Commodification of the Body 
Some authors argue that putting a mone-
tary value on a body part would result in a loss
of human dignity. Even in cases where this is
arguably true, as with slavery, it does not follow
that compensation for the donation of body
parts is wrong. As outlined by several authors,
there are numerous differences between slavery
and compensated donation.84 For example,
Michele Goodwin, in her book Black Markets,
points out that in slavery there was no choice—
it was compulsory, state enforced and protect-
ed, with no opt-out provisions.85 Therefore,
arguments that slavery is wrong do not lead to
the conclusion that incentives for organ dona-
tion are wrong.86 Furthermore, unlike slavery,
there are many forms of “commodification”
that are clearly not dehumanizing. For exam-
ple, there is no evidence that sperm or egg
donors or surrogate mothers have diminished
self-dignity or self-worth. There is also no nec-
essary connection between the commodifica-
tion of bodies or body parts and the commod-
ification of persons. Stephen Wilkinson, in his
article “Commodification Arguments for the
Legal Prohibition of Organ Sales,” points out
that there is no indication that organ sales are
any more likely to cause the commodification
of persons than other widely accepted prac-
tices, such as altruistic organ donation and
compensated labor.87 The anti-commodifica-
tion argument may have tremendous emo-
tional impact, but lacks supporting data. As
Michael Gill and Robert Sade put it in their
well-known Kennedy Institute of Ethics article,
“My Kidney Is Not My Humanity,”88 “human-
ity—what gives us dignity and intrinsic value—
is our ability to make rational decisions, and a
person can continue to make rational deci-
sions with only one kidney.”89
No doubt, some of the concern regarding
commodification comes from our own (indus-
trialized Western civilization) history. Lori
Andrews, in an article in the Hastings Center
Report (one of the oldest and most renowned
bioethics journals), notes that “some of the
finest advances in society have resulted from a
refusal to characterize human beings (blacks,
women, children) as property,” but elaborates,
“I am advocating not that people be treated by
others as property, but only that they have the
autonomy to treat their own parts as proper-
ty.”90 Just as attitudes and laws have changed
regarding characterization of blacks, women,
and children as property, societal attitudes are
critical to the dignity of compensated donors. If
compensated donors are treated as heroes who
receive compensation for their pain and have
their rights and interests protected, they can sell
their kidneys without any loss of dignity.91
Heroism does not preclude payment: many
other heroes (such as police officers and fire-
fighters) are compensated for their heroic work.
In part, dignity is something we convey by
our behavior and attitudes. If we establish a
system of compensation, it is our responsi-
bility to create a culture of dignity for com-
pensated donors. Some thoughtful authors
on these topics suggest using the term “com-
pensated donation” or “rewarded gifting” to
confer dignity to the procedure.92
Some detractors argue that body integrity is
and should be more highly valued than allow-
ing compensation for organs would indicate.93
They argue that compensated donors are likely
to have longstanding emotional or psycholog-
ical damage because of the breaks in their bod-
ily integrity. For example, Stephen Wigmore
and collegues in their article “Defending the
Indefensible?” argue that “violation of this
integrity is not well compensated for, other
than by spiritual/philosophical gains such as
acting in an altruistic fashion.”94
But, again, little evidence supports this con-
cept of negative violation. Surgical procedures, a
direct violation of bodily integrity, do not usually
lead to long-term psychological harm or damage
to human dignity. One could argue that surgical
procedures are necessary for the curing of disease,
so their violation of bodily integrity is thus justi-
fied. But, for example, the entire field of plastic
surgery requires a break in bodily integrity. In
addition, numerous occupations and recreation-
al activities are associated with risks to bodily
integrity, yet we do not prevent people’s involve-
ment in these activities. And many cultures and
religions throughout the world violate bodily
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integrity as part of their beliefs (for example,
through piercings or male circumcision).
Furthermore, individuals who see receiving com-
pensation for organs as offensive can offer to
donate without compensation. The “commodifi-
cation” argument simply does not justify a total
ban on compensated donation.
An extension of this argument is the con-
cept that a system of compensation would
harm society, because an individual’s value
would shrink to be the sum value of his or her
body parts. In reality, the court system (for
example, through damage claims) regularly
establishes monetary values for loss of or dam-
age to various body parts or functions; this
assignment of value has not resulted in a loss
of appreciation for the overall, intangible value
of an individual human being. Similarly, estab-
lishment of a system of sperm or egg donation
or surrogate motherhood has not harmed soci-
ety. There are many other situations in which
we give rewards or incentives to community
members—outstanding citizens, dedicated
teachers, families left behind by soldiers killed
in battle—without commodifying or diminish-
ing the value of their gift to society.95 Similarly,
money is often given to others—presents, bap-
tismal gifts, condolences to the bereaved—
without any loss of dignity.96 None of these
practices diminish the value of the individual. 
Arguments that Assume Compensation
Would Exploit the Poor
The core of this argument is that kidney dona-
tion is risky, and, because the poor are more like-
ly to sell a kidney than the rich, the financial offer
will override a donor’s better judgment. In a
broader context, the concern is that the citizens of
Third World countries would become donors for
citizens of industrialized countries. It is easy to
dismiss this concern, because the system being
discussed here would prohibit such a situation.
The system advocated here is constructed
to prevent exploitation. In the Third World
there is little (if any) pre- or posttransplant
care of donors, and donors often do not
receive the promised payment. The system
described here is specifically designed to pre-
vent such abuse of donors.
The fact that kidney donation has risks
plays an important role in the exploitation
argument. However, the risks of kidney dona-
tion cannot justify a ban on compensated
donation. As discussed above, if surgical risk
alone were sufficient to justify a ban on com-
pensated donation, it should also be sufficient
to justify a ban on altruistic donation. In addi-
tion, our society allows the less wealthy to take
many high-risk jobs that the rich are unlikely
to take (such as police officers, deep-sea divers,
firefighters, military “volunteers,” and North
Sea oil rig workers). And we allow both rich
and poor to engage in recreational activities
that have considerably greater risk than kid-
ney donation, such as smoking, mountain
climbing, skydiving, and bungee jumping.
Serious objections have never been raised
about permitting financial incentives to
encourage middle- and upper-class people to
be compensated donors.97 The “exploitation”
argument against compensated donation
becomes, in part, the argument that the poor
are more likely to be compensated donors than
the rich. The dictionary definition of exploita-
tion is “utilization of another selfishly,”98 that
is, deriving wrongful advantage from the
calamity of others. It is not clear that compen-
sated donation would take wrongful advan-
tage of anyone. First, it would benefit a subset
of the population, namely, patients, whether
poor or rich, with ESRD who are waiting for a
transplant. Second, if the donor makes an
autonomous decision and, in return, receives
substantial compensation that may signifi-
cantly improve his or her quality of life, we
must ask, is this truly exploitation? Or, all
things considered, is the notion of “exploita-
tion” even of moral importance in this con-
text? As one scholar points out, “In reality, any
financial transaction would seem to have
effects that differentiate based on income
level.”99 With compensated donation, “in a sur-
prising contravention of our usual ideas about
individual liberty, we prevent adults from
entering freely into contracts from which both
sides expect to benefit, and with no obvious
harm to anyone else.”100 By prohibiting the
poor from being compensated donors, we
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remove one opportunity for them to better
their lives. 
Some detractors erroneously equate eco-
nomic opportunity with an unacceptable
form of inequality that they see as exploitative
of the poor. This type of argument was dis-
cussed in a recent Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Journal article where the authors state, “if pay-
ing for kidneys is legalized, the ratio of poor
people with only one kidney to rich people
with only one kidney probably will
increase.”101 This result could be seen as not
being equal. But, the authors emphasize,
“The kind of equality that matters to egalitar-
ians, however, concerns not the presence of
one kidney vs. two but economic and political
power. There is no reason to believe that
allowing payment for kidneys will worsen the
economic or political status of kidney sellers
in particular or of poor people in general.”102
Most importantly, the “exploitation” argu-
ment centers on whether a system of compen-
sated organ donation would take wrongful
advantage of the calamity of others and on
whether the financial offer would override the
better judgment of individuals in desperate
need. No doubt, a significant financial offer
would provide hard choices for people in need.
But there is a difference between a “hard
choice” and “no choice.” I do not think we are
willing to say that being poor removes the abil-
ity to make rational decisions (if we believed
that, we would need legal guardians to vet any
decision an impoverished person makes). A
system that allows compensation for organs is
not necessarily exploitative if it provides sig-
nificant incentives (an amount that has the
potential to make a positive impact on the
compensated donor’s life) and if it includes
procedural safeguards to ensure that donors
know what they are doing and are acting vol-
untarily to seek their individual best. In the
case of compensated kidney donation, the sys-
tem would not be seeking the typical
exploiter’s “wrongful gain,” but would be estab-
lished to help both patients and donors experi-
ence a better quality of life.
Supporters of compensation for organ
donation often counter the “exploitation”
argument by suggesting that the ban on com-
pensated donation removes potential options
for the poor, and leaves them poor; whereas if
they could sell a kidney, it would give them the
possibility to better their lives.103 One author
notes, “Banning payment on ethical grounds
to prevent [exploitation] overlooks one impor-
tant fact: to the person who needs money to
feed his children or to purchase medical care
for her parent, the option of not selling a body
part is worse than the option of selling it.”104
The ideal solution to the problem of the
poor being more likely to be compensated
donors would be to end poverty. Tamara
Zutlevics suggests in her article “Markets and
the Needy: Organ Sales or Aid?” that, rather
than allowing compensated donation, we
should provide additional aid to the poor.105
The reality, however, is that no evidence sug-
gests that poverty will disappear in the near
future, no matter how much financial aid is
provided. Forbidding compensated donation
does nothing to eradicate poverty and has no
effect on whether or not additional aid might
be forthcoming. One prominent bioethicist,
Robert Veatch, once suggested that, rather
than permit compensated donation, we
should prompt social change to end poverty,
but he has become pessimistic about the possi-
bility of social change and now favors compen-
sated donation.106 Veatch now offers a different
perspective, noting that “irresistibly attractive”
financial offers are not usually felt to be unethi-
cal. He asks why offers (to induce consent to
procure organs) that are irresistible because of
the amount of compensation being offered are
deemed unethical, while offers of jobs and
offers of basic necessities are not. Further, he
suggests that the ethical problem is not that
the offer is attractive to its recipient, as com-
pared with the alternatives available, but “must
be understood in terms of the options available
to the one making the offer.”107 Veatch’s origi-
nal concern about compensated donation was
that the (political) decisionmakers could, in
effect, force the poor to sell their organs by
withholding alternative means of addressing
their problems. Reexamining the issue 20 years
later, he now concludes that our society has
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done little to help the poor, and with “shame
and bitterness” proposes that it is time to lift
the ban on compensated donation, “If we are a
society that deliberately and systematically
turns its back on the poor, we must confess our
indifference to the poor and lift the prohibi-
tion on the one means they have to address
their problems themselves.”108
Finally, it is argued that in a government-
controlled single-payer system there would
be pressure to lower the price compensated
for each kidney, that is, institutionalized
“exploitation” would occur (as described
above by Veatch). But this is unlikely because
the price offered for a kidney would need to
be sufficient to “encourage” potential donors
to step forward. In a welfare state like the
United States, where the most basic of needs
are met by society, the poor will not step for-
ward simply to meet those basic needs. The
compensation offered must increase their
standard of living beyond what is otherwise
available through state and private aid, or
they won’t donate.
A Balance of Principles
Opponents of a system of compensation for
any of the reasons detailed above imply that they
are taking the moral high ground by protecting
the potential compensated donor (supposedly
from exploitation or from the harm of surgery)
or by protecting society (supposedly from loss of
human dignity). The end result, however, is that
they are sentencing many transplant candidates
to death or to ongoing suffering on dialysis and
denying many potential donors an opportunity
to improve their lives.
There is no avoiding the ethical dilemma:
yes, kidney donation has risks, albeit small; yes,
the poor are more likely to become compen-
sated donors. But the prohibition of financial
incentives now results in the (preventable)
death of many transplant candidates and the
languishing of many on dialysis. And prohibi-
tion prevents potential compensated donors
from receiving a payment that will benefit
them as well. Even those who oppose compen-
sation recognize this dilemma and waffle
when discussing the issue. Some propose an
“ethical incentive”—payment of $300 to con-
senting families of potential deceased donors
for funeral expenses.109 Others propose a gold
medal—but the medal would have significant
value ($10,000) and could be sold.110
As described above, the four principles
defined by Beauchamp and Childress111
(respect for autonomy; beneficence; justice;
and nonmaleficence) conflict not only when
applied to compensated donation but also
when applied to altruistic donation. Balancing
the advantages against the harms is similar in
both situations. And in each case, the benefits
of permitting donation outweigh the harms. 
At the end of the day, one must cut
through all the passion and rhetoric and ask
this very simple question: What is the better
option–establishing a system of compensa-
tion (even if doing so might not be easy) or
maintaining the status quo (under which
transplant candidates are suffering and
dying on dialysis)?
The better option is to eliminate the ban
on financial incentives so that we can increase
the number of transplants, significantly
decrease or eliminate deaths on the waiting
list, and improve the overall survival rates and
quality of life for patients with ESRD. It is
time to eliminate the 1984 National Organ
Transplant Act prohibition against “valuable
consideration” for organs. Once the ban on
incentives is lifted, we can initiate pilot trials
to determine how best to preserve the rights
and improve the lives of both kidney donors
and kidney recipients.
The issue of compensated kidney donation
is not a hypothetical ethical fine point; it
affects the lives of people worldwide. Leon
Kass, former chairman of the President’s
Council on Bioethics and a staunch opponent
of compensation, writes, “I suspect that regard-
less of all my arguments to the contrary, I
would probably make every effort and spare no
expense to obtain a suitable life-saving kidney
for my child—if my own were unusable. . . . I
think I would readily sell one of my own kid-
neys, were its practice legal, if it were the only
19
At the end of 
the day, one must
ask this simple 
question: Which
is the better
option—
establishing a
system of 
compensation
(even though it
might not be
easy) or 
maintaining the
status quo 
(while transplant 
candidates suffer
and die)?
way to pay for a life-saving operation for my
children or my wife.”112
Notes
The author would like to thank Mary Knatterud
for editorial assistance and Stephanie Daily for
assistance in the preparation of this manuscript.
1.   See, for example, R. A. Wolfe et al., “Comparison
of Mortality in All Patients on Dialysis, Patients on
Dialysis Awaiting Transplantation, and Recipients
of a First Cadaveric Transplant,” New England
Journal of Medicine 341 (1999): 1725–30.
2.   F. G. Cosio et al., “Patient Survival after Renal
Transplantation. I. The Impact of Dialysis
Pretransplant,” Kidney Inernational 53 (1998):
767–72; H. U. Meier-Kreische et al., “Effect of
Waiting Time on Renal Transplant Outcome,”
Kidney International 58 (2000): 1311–17.
3.   A. O. Ojo et al., “Survival in Recipients of Marginal
Cadaveric Donor Kidneys Compared with Other
Recipients and Wait-Listed Transplant Patients,”
Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 2 (2001):
589–97.
4.   R. M. Merion et al., “Deceased Donor Charac-
teristics and the Survival Benefit of Kidney
Transplantation,” Journal of the American Medical
Association 294, no. 21 (2005): 2726–33.
5.   V. Casingal et al., “Death on the Kidney Waiting
List—Good Candidates or Not?” American Journal
of Transplantation 6, no. 8 (2006): 1953–56. 
6.   J. L. Xue et al., “Forecast of the Number of Pat-
ients with End-Stage Renal Disease in the United
States to the Year 2010,” Journal of the American
Society of Nephrology 12 (2001): 2753–58.
7.   E. Sheehy et al., “Estimating the Number of Poten-
tial Organ Donors in the United States,” New England
Journal of Medicine 349, no. 7 (2003): 667–74. 
8.   See www.unos.org. 
9.   J. D. Schold et al., “The Overlapping Risk Pro-
file between Dialysis Patients Listed and Not
Listed for Renal Transplantation,” American
Journal of Transplantation (accepted for publica-
tion, exact publication date unknown).
10.  See W. D. Park et al., “Accommodation in
ABO-Incompatible Kidney Allografts, a Novel
Mechanism of Self-Protection against Antibody-
Mediated Injury,” American Journal of Transplanta-
tion 3, no. 8 (2003): 952–60; and J. M. Gloor et al.,
“Overcoming a Positive Crossmatch in Living-
Donor Kidney Transplantation,” American Journal
of Transplantation 3, no. 8 (2003): 1017–23.
11.  K. Park et al., “Exchange Donor Program in
Kidney Transplantation,” Transplantation 67
(1999): 336–38. F. L. Delmonico et al., “Donor
Kidney Exchange for Incompatible Recipients,”
American Journal of Transplantation 3 (2003): 550.
12.  A. J. Matas et al., “Nondirected Donation of
Kidneys from Living Donors,” New England
Journal of Medicine 343, no. 6 (2000): 433–36.
13.  N. Scheper-Hughes, “The Global Traffic in Hu-
man Organs,” Current Anthropology 41 (2000):
191–222.
14.  A. Leichtman, “Kidney Allocation Policy under
Development,” Presentation at Health and Human
Services Advisory Committee on Organ Transplan-
tation, Rockville, Maryland, May 15, 2007. See also
R. A. Wolfe et al. “A Modification to Kidney
Transplant Allocation to Save More Patient Years of
Life,” American Journal of Transplantation 7 (supple-
ment): 230, 2007.
15. J. Harris and C. Erin, “An Ethically Defensible
Market in Organs” (editorial), British Medical Journal
325 (2002): 114–15; A. J. Matas, “The Case for Living
Kidney Sales: Rationale, Objections, and Concerns,”
American Journal of Transplantation 4 (2004): 2007–17;
A. J. Matas, “Why We Should Develop a Regulated
System of Kidney Sales: A Call for Action!” Clinical
Journal of the American Society of Nephrology 1 (2006):
1129–32; A. S. Daar, “The Case for a Regulated
System of Living Kidney Sales,” National Clinical
Practice of Nephrology 2, no. 11 (2006): 600-601; B. E.
Hippen, “In Defense of a Regulated Market in
Kidneys from Living Vendors,” Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy 30 (2005): 593–626.
16.  R. S. Gaston et al., “Limiting Financial Disin-
centives in Live Organ Donation: A Rational
Solution to the Kidney Shortage,” American
Journal of Transplantation 6 (2006): 2548–2555.
17.  See R. W. Steiner and G. Danovitch, “The Medical
Evaluation and Risk Estimation of End-Stage Renal
Disease for Living Kidney Donors,” in Educating,
Evaluating, and Selecting Living Kidney Donors, ed. Robert
W. Steiner. (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer, 2004),
pp. 51–79; J. S. Najarian et al., “20 Years or More of
Follow-Up of Living Kidney Donors,” Lancet 340, no.
8823 (1992): 807–810; P. Baudoin et al., “Renal
Function up to 50 Years after Unilateral Nephrectomy
in Childhood,” American Journal of Kidney Diseases 21,
no. (1993): 603–11; D. M. Narkun-Burgess et al.,
“Forty-Five Year Follow-Up after Uninephrectomy,”
Kidney International 43, no. 5 (1993): 1110–15.
18.  I. Fehrman-Ekholm et al., “Kidney Donors Live
20
Longer: Transplantation Nephrectomy,” Journal of
Urology 166, no. 6 (2001): 2043–47; T. Ramcharan and
A. J. Matas, “Long-Term (20–37 Years) Follow-up of
Living Kidney Donors,” American Journal of
Transplantation 2, no. 10 (2002): 959–64; I. Fehrman-
Ekholm et al., “Incidence of End-Stage Renal Disease
among Live Kidney Donors,” Transplantation 82, no. 12
(2006): 1646–48.
19.  J. Radcliffe-Richards, “Nefarious Goings on:
Kidney Sales and Moral Arguments,” Journal of
Medicine and Philosophy 21 (1996): 375–416.
20.  Ibid., pp. 375–416.
21.  M. B. Gill and R. M. Sade, “Paying for Kid-
neys: The Case against Prohibition,” Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal 12, no. 1 (2002):17–45.
22.  Ibid., pp. 17–45.
23.  Ibid., pp. 17–45.
24.  Scheper-Hughes, pp. 191–222; M. Goyal et al.,
“Economic and Health Consequences of Selling a
Kidney in India,” Journal of the American Medical
Association 288, no. 13 (2002): 1589–93; A. S. Daar,
“Money and Organ Procurement: Narratives
from the Real World,” in Ethical, Legal, and Social
Issues in Organ Transplantation, ed. T. H. Gutmann,
A. S. Daar, R. Sells, and W. Land, (Lengerich,
Germany: Pabst Publishers, 2004).
25.  M. M. Friedlaender, “The Right to Sell or Buy a
Kidney: Are We Failing Our Patients?” Lancet 359
(2002): 971–73; J. Rapoport et al., “Legalizing the Sale
of Kidneys for Transplantation: Suggested Guide-
lines,” Israeli Medical Association Journal 4 (2002):
1131–34.
26.  Gutmann, Daar, Sells, and Land. 
27.  A. J. Matas and M. Schnitzler, “Payment for
Living Donor (Vendor) Kidneys: A Cost-Effective-
ness Analysis,” American Journal of Transplantation
4, no. 2 (2004): 216–21.
28.  A standard quality-adjusted life-years (QALY)
calculation was done. QALYs are a way of mea-
suring both the quality and the quantity of life
lived, as a means of quantifying the benefit of a
medical intervention. See ibid., pp. 216–21.
29.  Matas and Schnitzler, pp. 216–21.
30.  Republican Study Committee, Legislative Bulletin,
March 6, 2007. In the bulletin the financial impact
of the Living Kidney Organ Donation Act is
described as follows: “An official CBO score of H.R.
710 is unavailable. However, according to the spon-
sor’s office, a preliminary CBO analysis estimated
the bill would realize savings of $30 million over five
years, and $500 million over 10 years,” http://
www.house.gov/hensarling/rsc/doc/LB030607add
tlsuspension.doc. A search of the Congressional
Budget Office website at http://www.cbo.gov/
revealed no published document referring to H.R.
710 or the impact of paired kidney donation.
31.  C. Gilbert et al., “The Nondirected Living Donor
Program: A Model for Cooperative Donation,
Recovery and Allocation of Living Donor Kidney,”
American Journal of Transplantation 5, no. 1 (2005):
167–74; P. J. Mark et al., “Experience with an Organ
Procurement Organization-Based Non-Directed
Living Kidney Donation Programme,” Clinical
Transplantation 20, no. 4 (2006): 427–37.
32.  A. J. Matas, “Design of a Regulated System of
Compensation for Living Kidney Donors,”
Clinical Transplantation (forthcoming).
33.  Institute of Medicine of the National Academies,
Organ Donation—Opportunities for Action (Washing-
ton: National Academies Press, 2006).
34.  D. LaPointe Rudow et al., “Living Donor Insur-
ability and Its Impact on Donor Health Care”
(abstract), American Journal of Transplantation 6 (supple-
ment.) (2006): 468; K. S. Clarke et al., “The Direct and
Indirect Economic Costs Incurred by Living Kidney
Donors—A Systematic Review,” Nephrol Dial Trans-
plant 21 (2006): 1952–60; R. C. Yang et al., “Insurabil-
ity of Living Donors: A Systematic Review,” American
Journal of Transplantation 7 (2007): 1452–1551. 
35.  Rudow et al., p. 468.
36.  Clarke et al., pp. 1952–60.
37.  Ibid., pp. 1952–60.
38.  Yang et al., pp. 1452–1551.
39.  Matas and Schnitzler, pp. 216–21.
40.  See Michele Goodwin, Black Markets: The Supply
and Demand of Body Parts (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2006).
41.  Institute of Medicine of the National Academies.
42.  Ibid.
43.  Adopted by the 39th World Medical Association,
October 1987, Madrid, Spain.
44.  Council of the Transplantation Society, “Com-
mercialization in Transplantation: The Problems and
Some Guidelines for Practice,” Lancet2 (1985): 715–16.
45. World Health Organization, “Legislative Re-
21
sponses to Organ Transplantation” (Dordrecht,
Armsterdam: Martinus Niojhoff, 1994), p. 467.
46.  The National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C.,
274e (2002).
47.  Institute of Medicine of the National Academies.
48.  P. I. Terasaki et al., “High Survival Rates of Kidney
Transplants from Spousal and Living Unrelated
Donors,” New England Journal of Medicine 333, no. 6
(1995): 333–36; D. W. Gjertson and J. M. Cecka,
“Living Unrelated Donor Kidney Transplantation,”
Kidney International 58, no. 2 (2000): 491–99.
49.  D. J. Rothman et al., “The Bellagio Task Force
Report on Transplantation, Bodily Integrity, and
the International Traffic in Organs,” Transplan-
tation Procedure 29 (1997): 2739–45.
50.  J. Radcliffe-Richards et al., “The Case for Allowing
Kidney Sales,” Lancet 351 (1998): 1950–52.
51.  D. S. Kittur et al., “Incentives for Organ Dona-
tion?” Lancet 338 (1992): 1441–43; A. Guttman and R.
D. Guttman, “Attitudes of Healthcare Professionals
and the Public Toward the Sale of Kidneys for
Transplantation,” Journal of Medical Ethics 19 (1993):
148–53.
52.  Kittur et al., pp. 1441–43.
53.  Ibid., pp. 148–53.
54.  Radcliffe-Richards, pp. 375–416.
55.  T. L. Beauchamp and J. F. Childress, eds., Principles
of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed. (U.S.A.: Oxford University
Press, 2001).
56. For a more detailed analysis of the issues relat-
ed to autonomy, commodification, and exploita-
tion see Narkun-Burgess et al., pp. 1110–15;
Radcliffe-Richards, pp. 375–416; L. D. de Castro,
“Commodification and Exploitation: Arguments
in Favour of Compensated Organ Donation,”
Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (2003): 142–46; J. S.
Taylor, Stakes and Kidneys: Why Markets in Human
Body Parts are Morally Imperative (Burlington, VT:
Ashgate, 2005); Mark J. Cherry, Kidney for Sale by
Owner. Human Organs, Transplantation, and the
Market (Washington: Georgetown University
Press, 2005); S. Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale: Ethics and
Exploitation in the Human Body Trade (London:
Routledge, 2003).
57.  A. J. Matas et al., “Morbidity and Mortality
after Living Kidney Donation in 1999–2001: A
Survey of United States Transplant Centers,”
American Journal of Transplantation 3, no. 7 (2003):
830–34.
58.  See for example, Steiner and Danovitch, pp.
51–79; Fehrman-Ekholm et al., “Kidney Donors
Live Longer,” pp. 976–78; Najarian et al., pp. 807–
810; T. Ramcharan and Matas, pp. 959–64;
Fehrman-Ekholm et al., “Incidence of End-Stage
Renal Disease among Live Kidney Donors,” pp.
1646–48. 
59.  Ibid.
60.  Institute of Medicine of the National Academies.;
M. Mauss, The Gift (London: W. W. Norton, 2000).
61.  Institute of Medicine of the National Academies.
62.  M. Valapour et al., “How Voluntary Is Consent
for Living Donation” (abstract), American Journal of
Transplantation 6 (supplement) (2006): 465.
63.  Cosio et al., pp. 767–72; Meier-Kreische et al.,
pp. 1311–17.
64.  Terasaki et al., pp. 333–36; Gjertson and Cecka,
pp. 491–99.
65.  Rudow et al., p. 468.
66.  S. J. Wigmore et al., “Defending the Indefen-
sible?” British Medical Journal 325 (2002): 114–15.
67.  See, for example, Robert Veatch, Transplantation
Ethics (Washington: Georgetown University Press,
2000), particularly where Veatch discusses the
Hippocratic ethic, pp. 30–34 and 277–86.
68.  V. A. Zelizer, “Human Values and the Market: The
Case of Life Insurance and Death in 19th-Century
America,” American Journal of Sociology 84 (1978):
591–610.
69.  A. Steinberg, “Compensation for Kidney Dona-
tion: A Price Worth Paying,” Israeli Medical Association
Journal 4 (2002): 1139–40; N. Capaldi, “A Catholic
Perspective on Organ Sales,” Christian Bioethics
2000 6, no. 2: 139–51; Pope John Paul II, “Special
Address to the Transplantation Society,” Transplanta-
tion Procedure 33 (2001): 31–32; R. V. Grazi and J. B.
Wolowelsky, “Jewish Medical Ethics: Monetary
Compansation for Donating Kidneys,” Israeli Medical
Association Journal 6 (2004): 185–87.
70.  Gill and Sade, pp. 17–45.
71.  D. Zimmerman, “Coercive Wage Offers,” Phil-
osophy and Public Affairs 10 (1981): 121–45.
72.  Capaldi, pp. 139–51.
73.  J. Rudinow, “Manipulation,” Ethics 88 (1978):
338–47, cited by M. J. Cherry, “Is a Market in
22
Human Organs Necessarily Exploitative?” Public
Affairs Quarterly 14 (2000): 337–360. 
74.  Radcliffe-Richards, pp. 375–416; Gill and Sade,
pp. 17–45; R. M. Veatch, “Why Liberals Should
Accept Financial Incentives for Organ Procure-
ment” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13, no. 1
(2003): 19–36.
75.  Mark J. Radin, Contested Commodities (Cam-
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1996), cited in M.
J. Cherry, “Is a Market in Human Organs Necessari-
ly Exploitative?” p. 346.
76.  J. Harvey, “Paying Organ Donors,” Journal of
Medical Ethics 16 (1990): 117–19.
77.  Mark J. Cherry, “Is a Market in Human Organs
Necessarily Exploitative?” pp. 337–60.
78.  Ibid., pp. 337–60.
79.  Taylor.
80.  Ibid.
81.  Ibid.
82.  Ibid.
83.  B. Hippen, “Preventive Measures May Not Re-
duce the Demand for Kidney Transplantation:
There is Reason to Suppose This Is Not the Case”
(letter to the editor), Kidney International 70 (2006):
606–07.
84.  Radcliffe-Richards, pp. 375–416, Wilkinson,
Bodies for Sale; N. Buttle, “Prostitutes, Workers and
Kidneys: Brecher on the Kidney Trade,” Journal of
Medical Ethics 17 (1991): 97–98.
85.  Goodwin, pp. 22–23, 194–203.
86.  Radcliffe-Richards, pp. 375–416.
87.  S. Wilkinson, “Commodification Arguments
for the Legal Prohibition of Organ Sales,” Health
Care Anals 8 (2000): 189–201.
88.  Gill and Sade, pp. 17–45.
89.  Ibid., pp. 17–45.
90.  L. B. Andrews, “My Body, My Property,” Hast-
ings Center Report 16, no. 5 (1986): 28–38.
91. T. Gutmann and W. Land, “Ethics in Living
Donor Organ Transplantation,” Langenbecks Archives of
Surgery (Overview Topics), 384, no. 6 (1999): S515–22.
92. Ibid., S515–22; F. L. Delmonico et al., “Ethical
Incentives—Not Payment—for Organ Donation”
(Sounding Board), New England Journal of Medicine
346(25) (2002): 2002–5.
93.  Wilkinson, Bodies for Sale.
94.  Wigmore et al., pp. 114–15.
95.  De Castro, pp. 142–46.
96.  Ibid., pp. 142–46.
97.  Radcliffe-Richards, pp. 375–416; T. Malakout-
ian et al., “Socioeconomic Status of Iranian Living
Unrelated Kidney Donors: A Multicenter Study,”
Transplantation Proceedure 39(4) (2007): 824–25.
98.  The American Heritage College Dictionary, 3rd ed.
(Boston: Houghton Mifflien Company, 1993).
99.  R. M. Veatch, “Why Liberals Should Accept
Financial Incentives for Organ Procurement,”
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13(1) (2003):
19–36.
100. Radcliffe-Richards, pp. 375–416.
101. Gill and Sade, pp. 17–45.
102. Ibid., pp. 17–45.
103. Radcliffe-Richards, pp. 375–416; Andrews,
pp. 28–38.
104. Ibid., pp. 28–38.
105. T. L. Zutlevics, “Markets and the Needy:
Organ Sales or Aid?” Journal of Applied Philosophy
18, no. 3 (2001), 297–302.
106. R. M. Veatch, pp. 19–36.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. R. Arnold et al., “Financial Incentives for Ca-
daver Organ Donation: An Ethical Reappraisal,”
Transplantation 73, no. 8 (2002): 1361–67. 
110. P. Terasaki, “A Congressional Gold Medal for
Transplant Donors and Families,” American Journal
of Transplantation 5, no. 5 (2005): 1167.
111. Beauchamp and Childress.
112. L. R. Kass, “Organs for Sale? Propriety,
Property, and the Price of Progress,” Public Interest
107 (Spring 1992): 65–86.
23
OTHER STUDIES IN THE POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES
603. What Can the United States Learn from the Nordic Model? by Daniel J.
Mitchell (November 5, 2007)
602. Do You Know the Way to L.A.? San Jose Shows How to Turn an Urban Area
into Los Angeles in Three Stressful Decades by Randal O’Toole (October 17, 2007)
601. The Freedom to Spend Your Own Money on Medical Care: A Common
Casualty of Universal Coverage by Kent Masterson Brown (October 15, 2007)
600. Taiwan’s Defense Budget: How Taipei’s Free Riding Risks War by Justin
Logan and Ted Galen Carpenter (September 12, 2007)
599. End It, Don’t Mend It: What to Do with No Child Left Behind by Neal 
McCluskey and Andrew J. Coulson (September 5, 2007)
598. Don’t Increase Federal Gasoline Taxes—Abolish Them by Jerry Taylor and 
Peter Van Doren (August 7, 2007)
597. Medicaid’s Soaring Cost: Time to Step on the Brakes by Jagadeesh 
Gokhale (July 19, 2007)
596. Debunking Portland: The City That Doesn’t Work by Randal O’Toole 
(July 9, 2007)
595. The Massachusetts Health Plan: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly by 
David A. Hyman (June 28, 2007)
594. The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies Choose Bad Policies
by Bryan Caplan (May 29, 2007)
593. Federal Aid to the States: Historical Cause of Government Growth and 
Bureaucracy by Chris Edwards (May 22, 2007)
592. The Corporate Welfare State: How the Federal Government Subsidizes 
U.S. Businesses by Stephen Slivinski (May 14, 2007)
591. The Perfect Firestorm: Bringing Forest Service Wildfire Costs under 
Control by Randal O’Toole (April 30, 2007)
PA Masthead.indd   2 2/9/06   2:08:35 PMUntitled-2   2 2/7/06   4:35:00 PM
